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a b s t r a c t
Wild birds are the primary source of genetic diversity for inﬂuenza A viruses that eventually
emerge in poultry and humans. Much progress has been made in the descriptive ecology
of avian inﬂuenza viruses (AIVs), but contributions are less evident from quantitative studies (e.g., those including disease dynamic models). Transmission between host species,
individuals and ﬂocks has not been measured with sufﬁcient accuracy to allow robust
quantitative evaluation of alternate control protocols. We focused on the United States
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of America (USA) as a case study for determining the state of our quantitative knowledge of
potential AIV emergence processes from wild hosts to poultry. We identiﬁed priorities for
quantitative research that would build on existing tools for responding to AIV in poultry
and concluded that the following knowledge gaps can be addressed with current empirical data: (1) quantiﬁcation of the spatio-temporal relationships between AIV prevalence
in wild hosts and poultry populations, (2) understanding how the structure of different
poultry sectors impacts within-ﬂock transmission, (3) determining mechanisms and rates
of between-farm spread, and (4) validating current policy-decision tools with data. The
modeling studies we recommend will improve our mechanistic understanding of potential
AIV transmission patterns in USA poultry, leading to improved measures of accuracy and
reduced uncertainty when evaluating alternative control strategies.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Emergence of avian inﬂuenza viruses (AIVs) in poultry remains a global problem that can cost hundreds of
millions of US dollars (Halvorson, 2009; Lupiani and Reddy,
2009). In the USA, even low-pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
viruses (LPAIVs) can cost millions of dollars to control
once detected in commercial poultry (Davison et al., 1999;
Halvorson, 2009). Major goals of the USA national plan (Foreign Animal Diseases Preparedness and Response Plan) for
minimizing losses due to AIVs are: (1) to prevent the introduction of AIVs into poultry, (2) to identify infected ﬂocks as
quickly as possible, and (3) to eliminate the virus as quickly
as possible once it is detected (USDA, 2012). These goals are
achieved through biosecurity (management procedures
that minimize introduction or dissemination of infectious
diseases), diagnostics and surveillance (detection of AIVs),
depopulation and controlled slaughter, education of ﬂock
owners/workers and public outreach, all of which occur in
a planned, coordinated manner (USDA, 2012).
In developing and implementing speciﬁc prevention
and response activities, multiple biological, political and
economic factors are considered, such as virus pathotype
(either highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus: HPAIV, or
LPAIV), the poultry commodity or commodities affected,
the type of operation (i.e., commercial, backyard or livebird market), the density of poultry in a geographic area, the
demands of export markets, federal versus state regulatory
authority, availability of ﬁnancial compensation, public
perception and potential for zoonotic transmission of the
virus. Thus, the numerous response activities that occur
depend on scenario-speciﬁc circumstances. The success of
any strategy is dependent on trust, co-operation and interaction between industry and government (Swayne and
Akey, 2005). Consequently, it can be challenging to assimilate all of the necessary information during an emergency.
Sound quantitative tools are essential for preparedness and
response planning.
Preparedness and response modeling are two complementary quantitative approaches for informing policybased decisions made during an AIV event. During
preparedness modeling, there is more time for model
formulation, evaluation and “situational analysis”, but
appropriate data from previous outbreaks may be unavailable or irrelevant. In response modeling, appropriate
quantitative data are likely being collected and analyzed

as the outbreak unfolds, but time for detailed evaluation
of quantitative methods is very limited. Because preparedness and response modeling involve similar methods
and data, preparedness modeling can and does facilitate
response modeling. The development, detailed investigation, and validation of several sound quantitative
approaches prior to an event are important for performing
response analyses with high conﬁdence in a short period
of time.
Disease-dynamic models are useful for informing control policies (Anderson and May, 1992) because they
incorporate a quantitative description of how transmission changes during the course of an epidemic (Fig. 1).
Adding additional components, such as age-structure or
life-history stage, to simple disease-stage models (i.e.,
models with different disease states such as susceptible,
infectious or recovered; Fig. 1) allows determination of how
alternative control strategies, implemented at different
stages of the transmission process, will impact epidemic
dynamics. Disease-dynamic models are characterized by
the presence of a force of infection (rate at which a susceptible individual acquires disease) term that deﬁnes precisely
how the infection hazard experienced by a susceptible
individual (or farm) depends on the current number of
infectious individuals (or farms), their proximity and their
type. A key parameter that can usually be derived using the
force if infection term is the basic reproductive number,
R0 , deﬁned as the expected number of secondary infections generated by one infectious individual (or farm) in
an otherwise susceptible population. R0 is used to assess
the required proportion of a population that must be rendered non-transmissible for an outbreak to be controlled
(Heesterbeek and Roberts, 2007) and is predictive of the
impact of interventions in reducing the attack rate, even
when full control is not achieved (Wu et al., 2006). Sometimes, models are too complex in their assumptions about
the population or the pathogen for the derivation of R0 to
be tractable (e.g., individual-based spatial simulations).
Below, we outline some of the key policy decisions
related to minimizing AIV emergence in poultry, for which
quantitative disease-dynamic models could be of service.
The article is organized in three sections to reﬂect the stages
of emergence: (1) wildlife reservoir dynamics and spillover
to poultry, (2) transmission within poultry ﬂocks and (3)
transmission between poultry ﬂocks (Fig. 2). For each stage
of emergence, we highlight key quantitative data that are
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Fig. 1. Diagram illustrating a simple dynamic-disease model. The host population is divided into “compartments” that differ by disease status (left); in this
case susceptible, infectious or recovered (and presumed to be immune). Disease-dynamic models are a mathematical description of pathogen transmission.
Solving or conducting simulations with such a model gives an estimate of how the risk of infection within a population (i.e., ﬂock) changes over time. The
example shown here is for a pathogen with a basic reproductive number of 5 and a generation time of 5 days spreading through a population of 10,000
individuals. Here the force of infection is proportional to the number of currently infectious birds expressed as a ratio of the total population size.

currently available and could be incorporated into models
focused on reducing uncertainty in policy decisions. The
quantitative data we present are not comprehensive, rather
we focus on presenting the range of values that have been
observed. We also mention important data gaps, especially
with regards to spillover processes because this is the least
understood stage of emergence. Although transmission and
evolution are both important in outbreaks of AIV in poultry,
we focus primarily on transmission because key epidemiological processes such as the depletion of susceptible hosts
are far more predictable than evolutionary processes, such
as mutation and reassortment.
2. Reservoir dynamics and spillover to poultry
2.1. Control policies
Control measures for preventing either maintenance
within wildlife populations or spillover to poultry are
not currently conducted in wildlife populations (Cardona,
2005; Clark and Hall, 2006). In fact, some wildlife species
are not even considered when evaluating biosecurity measures in commercial poultry operations (McQuiston et al.,
2005), and operations with low biosecurity (i.e., backyard
ﬂocks or gamebird facilities) allow open access for wildlife
species (Slota et al., 2011). Typical biosecurity activities,
which are common in commercial operations, aim to prevent direct contact between high-risk wildlife species and
poultry (e.g., rodent control and wild bird exclusion; USDA,
2012). Many facilities also implement measures to prevent indirect contact with wildlife (e.g., contamination of
food and water supplies by wildlife), which may also be
important (Fig. 2A). Developing general policies to prevent spillover from wildlife to domestic poultry will require
additional quantitative information on wildlife contact
rates with poultry and risk assessment to determine which

wildlife species have the highest potential to transmit virus
to poultry.
2.2. Quantitative host population data
The key quantities required to understand transmission
of AIVs include host demographic dynamics, population
sizes, contact structure among host individuals, susceptibility and host species composition. The picture for
wild hosts is complicated relative to poultry populations
because it involves multiple species, each with ecologically
determined demographics, spatial interactions and movement patterns. Furthermore, numerous species are known
to be susceptible to AIVs but their role in maintenance
within the wild-host reservoir system and/or transmission
to poultry is unclear (Boyce et al., 2009; Fig. 2A). Population movement coupled with environmental transmission
is the main reason for this lack of understanding: multiple
species that move freely about their environment become
contaminated or get infected by environmental sources
(Henaux and Samuel, 2011; Brown et al., 2013a,b). Another
reason is that maintenance and spillover are distinct processes that are both important for AIV outbreaks in poultry:
spillover force of infection is driven by the product of contact rate between reservoir and target-host populations,
probability of infection of the target-host given contact, and
pathogen prevalence in the reservoir at the time of contact
(Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009).
Field surveys suggest that dabbling ducks, especially
mallards (Anas platyrhynchos), are an important reservoir
for most AIV subtypes, including subtypes that can lead
to HPAI in poultry (Hinshaw et al., 1980; Stallknecht and
Shane, 1988b; Stallknecht et al., 1990; Olsen et al., 2006;
Stallknecht and Brown, 2008; DeLiberto et al., 2009; Wilcox
et al., 2011; Bahl et al., 2013). In addition to being a primary
reservoir for AIVs, mallards are also the most abundant
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Fig. 2. Pathways of emergence of AIVs in commercial poultry operations. Red arrows indicate transitions between the different processes in emergence:
AIV spillover from wildlife to AIV spread within poultry ﬂocks on a single operation to AIV spread between poultry operations. (A) Spillover mechanisms
from wildlife (adapted from Franklin, 2008). Arrows represent movement of AIVs. Bold arrows indicate transmission links that are strongly supported by
empirical studies, thin arrows indicate connections that are supported by limited studies and dotted arrows indicate pathways that remain unexplored.
Indirect AIV transmission pathways from wild waterfowl (I and II) to poultry (VI) include: drinking contaminated water (III) or contacting non-waterfowl
bird species (V) or wild mammals (IV) that were infected through III. IV may also be infected by scavenging infected waterfowl carcasses by wild mammals.
*Note that the importance of direct transmission routes from waterfowl to poultry is well-supported in mixed-species backyard ﬂocks but the importance
of this connection in transmission to commercial poultry remains to be determined. It is possible that any of these links involve an intermediate link such
as human shoes, etc. (B) AIV spread within poultry operations. Once AIV infects poultry in a farm, it can be transmitted directly to other individuals or
indirectly through contaminated water, fomites or air. (C) AIV spread between poultry operations. The mechanisms are variable and currently uncertain,
particularly for airborne and local spread. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)

duck species in North America (Drilling et al., 2002). Furthermore, most experimental studies of AIVs in wild birds
have been in mallards, and thus there are more quantitative data on AIVs in mallards than in any other wildlife
host. Dose–response and contact experiments support the
idea that mallards are highly susceptible to most wildbird origin LPAIVs based on: (1) mallards can be infected
after exposure to low inoculation doses with multiple subtypes of LPAIVs (Swayne and Slemons, 2008; Brown et al.,
2013a,b), (2) high rates of infection occur after exposure
to high doses, and (3) transmission to contact birds occurs
readily (Webster et al., 1978; Hinshaw et al., 1980; Kida
et al., 1980; Alexander et al., 1986; Swayne, 2007; Mundt
et al., 2009). Thus, further progress in understanding LPAIV
persistence mechanisms and spillover risk could be made

by parameterizing dynamic models with population ecology data from mallards. We focus on mallards as the “wild
hosts” for the remainder of this article.
Population size over space and time can be extremely
variable and difﬁcult to measure for mallard populations,
in part because this species is very abundant and widely
distributed across North America (USFWS, 2012b). Breeding population size from aerial surveys conducted over
parts of Canada and the north-central USA (∼1.3 million
sq. mi.) was estimated at 10.6 ± 0.3 million birds in 2012,
an estimate about 15% above the 2011 estimate, 40% above
long-term averages, but slightly lower than the maximum
of ∼11.2 million breeding birds reported in 1958 (USFWS,
2012b). Reproductive success and annual survival are also
similarly variable. For example, estimates of nest success
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range from 1 to 17% nests hatching at least one egg and
vary with habitat type and breeding chronology (Emery
et al., 2005). Survival probabilities for females after ﬂedging vary by age and breeding status (i.e., breeding survival
tends to be higher than nonbreeding survival; Coluccy et al.,
2008) and population growth rate is sensitive to variability
in nonbreeding survival and other vital rates (Coluccy et al.,
2008). Also, mallard populations may increase or decrease
depending on environmental conditions (e.g., availability
of prairie-pond habitat) or variability in phenology (e.g.,
timing of nest initiation), which can vary by precipitation
or habitat availability (Greenwood et al., 1995). Thus a
constant population size over space and time cannot be
assumed, as it can for commercial poultry populations.
Challenge studies in mallards have shown that agestructure does not seem to be a major determinant of
infection dynamics, except on a very broad scale: mallards < 1 month old show higher viral loads (Costa et al.,
2010b) and mallards < 1 year are at least twice as likely to
be found infected (Munster et al., 2007; Farnsworth et al.,
2012) than those in other age-classes, suggesting that they
may be more susceptible or infectious. Similarly, ﬁeld data
demonstrate a difference between hatch year and afterhatch year birds. The difference in the ﬁeld is likely due to
immunity in adults that have been previously exposed to
multiple LPAIV strains (Wilcox et al., 2011). With regards to
differences between the sexes, results are mixed. For example, two studies found that males can shed up to 2 orders
of magnitude more virus by the cloacal route in challenge
experiments (Pepin et al., 2012) and are 15% more likely
to be found infected in natural populations as compared
to females (Farnsworth et al., 2012), but other studies have
found no differences between the sexes (Krauss et al., 2004;
Munster et al., 2007; Wilcox et al., 2011). Because mallard
populations tend to be male-biased, averaging 1.33 males
for every female in over-wintering populations (Drilling
et al., 2002), determining whether there exists signiﬁcant
transmission biases due to sex may be important.
As with most host populations, host mixing is likely
not homogenous but the quantitative, or even qualitative
nature of host contact patterns is not yet documented sufﬁciently to justify a different assumption. Bird banding
data are available for quantifying mallard movement patterns (Miller et al., 2013b) and an ongoing network analysis
will provide a much needed quantitative understanding of
annual mallard movement patterns throughout continental USA (CT Webb, unpublished data). An additional factor is
the ability for wild migratory birds to introduce a complete
genome (unreassorted) or segments of AIV intercontinentally. The observed frequency of AIV reassortment events
between continents varies greatly between studies ranging
from 0.25 to 45.0 percent (Miller et al., 2013a). Such translocation via migratory birds contributed in part to the spread
of highly pathogenic Asian strain H5N1 out of Southern
China and Southeast Asia across Central Asia, into Europe
and Africa (Kilpatrick et al., 2006; Salzberg et al., 2007;
Prosser et al., 2009; Gaidet et al., 2010; Gilbert et al., 2010;
Takekawa et al., 2010). Also, recent phylogenetic analyses
of A(H7N9) indicates that migratory birds from at least two
distinct and distant ﬂyways (Mediterranean-Black Sea and
East Asian) may have contributed to its emergence (Gao

et al., 2013; Kageyama et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2013). The
potential dissemination of newly emerging AIVs within
Eurasia to North America via migratory movements of birds
remains a concern (Feare, 2007; Gauthier-Clerc et al., 2007)
because phylogenetic analyses suggest that reassortment
between North American and Eurasian AIVs occurs in several groups of migratory birds including sea ducks (Fries
et al., 2013), dabbling ducks (Koehler et al., 2008; Wahlgren
et al., 2008), shorebirds and gulls (Makarova et al., 1999).
Thus, if these introductions are frequent, they could be
important in AIV persistence and should be considered in
mechanistic descriptions of AIV dynamics.
A quantitative understanding of interactions between
wild hosts and poultry (i.e., frequency or rate of contact) is
fundamental for parameterizing the spillover process in a
transmission model. Also, for AIV, contact must be quantiﬁed in two ways: directly through bird-to-bird interactions
and indirectly through sharing the same environment during a time period that virus can remain stable outside
the host. For example, an experiment employing camera
traps that record the number of direct contacts between
wild hosts and poultry over a set time period in a setting with low biosecurity (i.e., backyard ﬂock) would be
one way to quantify direct contact rates. Data on indirect
contact rates could also be extracted from the same experiment by summarizing the amount of time spent by wild
hosts in the same environment or water sources as poultry.
Other indirect contact data could be derived from longitudinal sampling of environmental DNA typed to species. In
the USA, areas where mallard populations overlap poultry populations at a coarse resolution are being described
qualitatively (CT Webb, unpublished data), but direct measurement of wild host-poultry interaction remains to be
conducted.
2.3. Quantitative AIV surveillance data
The most common LPAIV subtypes found in mallards
are: H3N8, H4N6 and H6N4 (Krauss et al., 2004; Olsen et al.,
2006; Munster et al., 2007; Wilcox et al., 2011), although
one study has found H5N2 to be common in the USA (40%
of all virus isolations; Pedersen et al., 2010). Although
HPAIV strains of H5N1 occur in dabbling ducks in some
parts of Asia, northern Africa and Eastern Europe; in the
USA only LPAIV strains of H5N1 viruses (from the NorthAmerican lineage) have been detected – despite numerous
large-scale sampling studies (Hanson et al., 2003; Krauss
et al., 2004; Pedersen et al., 2010; Wilcox et al., 2011). In
fact, considering all subtypes, only LPAIV strains have been
found in wild birds to date in the USA.
Prevalence of LPAIVs in mallards varies spatially along
north-south portions of migratory ﬂyways from >10 to 15%
in the northern staging grounds to <1–2% on wintering
grounds (Stallknecht and Shane, 1988a; Goekjian et al.,
2011). LPAIVs are most prevalent in late summer/early
fall, after the breeding season and during pre-migrational
staging (Wilcox et al., 2011). Annual prevalence ranges
from 1 to 5% during early winter and the spring migration to as high as 30–40% in early fall and during the fall
migration (Stallknecht and Shane, 1988a; Webster et al.,
1992; Hanson et al., 2003; Krauss et al., 2004; Wilcox
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et al., 2011). More long-term longitudinal sampling in areas
where prevalence is highest at the annual peak is needed to
examine whether these patterns are shared by all subtypes
equally and to understand the environmental, population
or immunity factors that cause them. These data also would
provide crucial information for verifying whether or not
current disease-dynamic models accurately capture transmission processes in important wild hosts and poultry.

Brown et al., 2006; Keawcharoen et al., 2008). Viral shedding also occurs in the feces, but is at a lower titer and
shorter duration. In addition to differences in shedding,
virulence in mallards and other ducks can range from no
clinical signs to 100% mortality depending on the clade of
H5N1 HPAIV, host species and age (Perkins and Swayne,
2002; Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006;
Pantin-Jackwood and Swayne, 2007).

2.4. Quantitative experimental data

2.5. Models

Numerous LPAIV challenge studies have been conducted in mallards. These quantitative data are the main
empirical data source for parameterizing disease-dynamic
models (Rohani et al., 2009). While there is inherent variation in data among studies due to differences in virus,
host individual and experimental design, there are emergent patterns in mallards (Table 1) that are different from
those in gallinaceous poultry (e.g., chickens and turkeys;
Mundt et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2011). Most challenge
experiments to date have characterized readily measurable parameters of infection, such as incubation period,
duration of infection, clinical outcome, viral shedding rates,
viral persistence in water and antibody response (Slemons
and Easterday, 1978; Webster et al., 1978; Kida et al.,
1980; Mundt et al., 2009; Spackman et al., 2009; Davidson
et al., 2010; Nazir et al., 2010; VanDalen et al., 2010;
Lebarbenchon et al., 2012). More recent studies have even
begun to quantify factors that explain infection variability
in nature such as host-individual health status (e.g., stress,
nutritional condition; Arsnoe et al., 2011; Reperant et al.,
2011) and infectious doses (Swayne and Slemons, 2008;
Brown et al., 2013a,b). However, few studies quantify other
immunity and transmission-related quantities, such as the
duration and strength of immunity to the same (homosubtypic) or different (heterosubtypic) subtypes (Park et al.,
2004; Fereidouni et al., 2009; Costa et al., 2010a; Jourdain
et al., 2010; Pepin et al., 2012) and transmission rates
and probabilities (Achenbach and Bowen, 2011), which are
fundamental components of LPAIV epidemiology. This is
mainly due to difﬁculties with maintaining wild hosts in
captivity for longer than 2–3 months, and simulating contact rates between wild hosts and poultry under natural
conditions. While it is challenging to interpret absolute
measures of laboratory-based transmission rates, quantifying the relative importance of different mechanisms
of transmission on individual-level infection parameters
is both interpretable and important for describing AIV
dynamics quantitatively.
In Table 1, we have focused on LPAIV in mallards because
HPAIV strains are not thought to contribute to the epidemiology of AIV in North American wild bird populations
(Hanson et al., 2003; Krauss et al., 2004; Pedersen et al.,
2010; Wilcox et al., 2011). However, experiments have
investigated the effects of HPAIVs nonetheless. Most HPAIV
trials in mallards have been conducted with H5N1 HPAIV
and these data indicate infection differs signiﬁcantly from
LPAIV, both in regards to clinical disease and patterns of
shedding. As opposed to LPAIV, the predominate route of
H5N1 HPAIV viral shedding in mallards and other waterfowl is via the respiratory tract (Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2004;

Transmission models have been used to synthesize
subsets of the data described above in order to generate additional quantitative insight into different aspects of
LPAIV transmission among wild birds in the USA. Example
applications are quantiﬁcation of the role of environmental transmission in maintenance of LPAIVs (Breban et al.,
2009) and the relative importance of trade routes and
migration as sources of introduction of HPAIV strains from
Asia (Winker and Gibson, 2010). However, risk models
of spillover of LPAIVs to poultry have yet to include the
spillover mechanism explicitly, largely due to the paucity
of appropriate quantitative data describing interactions or
transmission at the wildlife-poultry interface. With suitable empirical information at hand, such models would
take into account known geographic distributions of wild
bird migration routes, staging areas and breeding sites in
decomposing the transmission risk of LPAIVs to poultry
operations.
2.6. Priorities for quantitative research
Although there are a number of data gaps, there is an
appropriate literature base and databases for which largescale models could be developed. For example, continental
determinants of LPAIV prevalence in wild birds have been
identiﬁed by analytical models (Farnsworth et al., 2012).
Further quantiﬁcation with available data includes: (1)
linking the density of poultry to that of mallard abundance
indices (USFWS, 2012a) at a continental scale in space and
time using hunter-harvest and National Agricultural Statistics Service data (e.g., Fig. 3), and (2) examining the effects
of annual changes in the number of newly susceptible birds
on annual continental distributions of LPAIV in waterfowl
using national data on waterfowl recruitment (e.g., indices
used to set harvest regulations such as female age ratios;
Johnson et al., 1997; USFWS, 2012a) and LPAIV distributions from the U.S. Wild Bird AIV Surveillance program
(DeLiberto et al., 2009; Farnsworth et al., 2012). The ﬁrst
analysis would help to identify regions where commercial
poultry may have a high risk of spillover and thus where
surveillance should be increased and where contact experiments would help to quantify actual risk. It should be noted
that because there is currently no database summarizing
the spatial locations of backyard poultry, the results would
exclude risk from spillover to this sector. Thus, the overall
risk to commercial poultry may be underestimated because
backyard holdings, which could be a source of virus in commercial operations, have a higher risk of spillover from
wild birds due to their lower biosecurity practices. The second analysis will help with understanding how mallard
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Table 1
Quantitative values of the infection and transmission processes in mallards as determined from experimental data. We focused on results from cloacal and fecal samples since these are known to have the highest
LPAIV titers in mallards. Note that not all of these values would be used in a single model. Also, the table is not meant to be comprehensive in terms of capturing every sound experimental study, rather we aimed
to capture the range of values that have been observed using several examples.
Rangea -VI

Infection
Minimum
infectious dose
or BID50

≤10, BID50 :
103.1 , 101.9

Incubation period

0.5–2 days

Detection period
(IP)

Rangeb -PCR

Units

Experimental
measure

LPAIV strainsc

Dose

Host age

References

Caveatsd

Virions

Minimum
number of viral
particles that
lead to an
infectious
individual

H6N1, H6N3,
H8N4, H4N8,
H5N1

Variable

3 weeks to
1 month

Swayne and
Slemons
(2008), Brown
et al. (2013a,b)

1–2

Days

Number of
days between
inoculation and
detection of
virus

H5N2, H3N6,
H7N2; H3N8

106 –108

1–8months

Webster et al.
(1978), Kida
et al. (1980),
Spackman et al.
(2009), Costa
et al. (2010b)

7

7

Days

Number of
days that virus
is detected in
>75% of
infected ducks

H5N2, H3N8,
H4N6, H7N7

106

3–4 weeks,
5–6
months

Peak shedding
period

1–7

1–7

Days

Time points
during which
shedding rates
are >103

H3N8, H5N2;
H7N2; H1N2;
H4N1;

106 –108

3 weeks to
8 months

Peak shedding titer

103.4 –107

104 –107

Virions

Number of viral
particles shed
at the peak of
infection

H3N8, H5N2;
H7N2; H1N2;
H4N1;

106 –108

3 weeks to
8 months

Spackman et al.
(2009), Costa
et al. (2010b),
Jourdain et al.
(2010), Brown
et al. (2012),
Pepin et al.
(2012)
Webster et al.
(1978), Kida
et al. (1980),
Spackman et al.
(2009), Brown
et al. (2012)
Webster et al.
(1978), Kida
et al. (1980),
Spackman et al.
(2009), Brown
et al. (2012)

Brown: Other strains
were tested and did
not cause infection at
doses as high as 101.9 ;
Swayne: BID50 (rather
than minimum
infectious dose) for
mallard-origin viruses.
A chicken-origin virus
(H4N8) had a BID50 of
103.3 . Swayne’s study
was performed in Pekin
ducks (mallard-derived
domestic duck).
The ﬁrst sample was
collected at 1 day, thus
earlier incubation
times could not be
determined; Webster
and Kida manuscripts
detected viral shedding
at <1 DPI
Mean across replicates
and experiments

Means across replicates
and experiments.

Means across replicates
and experiments. Some
birds excrete up to 109
EID50 /g feces.
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Parameter

?

?

Days

Length of
heterosubtypic
immunity

?

?

Days

Strength of
homosubtypic
immunity on
shedding

Not quantiﬁed
(but not 100%)

%

Strength of
heterosubtypic
immunity on
shedding

99.2

%

Strength of
homosubtypic
immunity on IP

75

%

Strength of
heterosubtypic
immunity on IP

0–60, 45

%

Number of days
that infection with
a strain of the same
H/N subtype is
suppressed
Number of days
that infection with
a strain from a
different H/N
subtype is
suppressed
Percent reduction
in total viral load
that occurs during
secondary infection
with a strain of the
same H/N subtype
compared with
primary infection
Percent reduction
in total viral load
that occurs during
secondary infection
with a strain from a
different H/N
subtype compared
with primary
infection
Percent reduction
in IP that occurs
during secondary
infection with a
strain of the same
H/N subtype
compared with
primary infection
Percent reduction
in IP that occurs
during secondary
infection with a
strain from a
different H/N
subtype compared
with primary
infection

No studies to
our knowledge

No studies to
our knowledge

H7N7

108.7

H3N8 → H4N6; 106 –108.7
H5N2 &
H3N8

3 months

Jourdain et al.
(2010)

Data are not presented
quantitatively

1–6
months

Costa et al.
(2010a),
Jourdain et al.
(2010), Pepin
et al. (2012)

Second infections were
conducted 21 days
after ﬁrst. Arrow
represents one-way
cross-immunity assay;
& represents two-way.

H7N7

108.7

3 months

Jourdain et al.
(2010)

H5N2 &
H3N8,
H3N8 → H4N6

106

4 months

Costa et al.
(2010a), Pepin
et al. (2012)
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Length of
homosubtypic
immunity

Second infections were
conducted 21 days
after ﬁrst. Arrow
represents one-way
cross-immunity assay;
& represents two-way.
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Table 1 (Continued)
Units

Experimental
measure

LPAIV
strainsc

Dose

Host age

References

Caveatsd

Direct transmission
Transmission
probability

100

%

% of hosts infected
given contact with
an infected host
(assumes that
probability is
constant
throughout the
infectious period)

H5N2,
H7N3

NR

2–4
months

Achenbach and
Bowen (2011)

Transmission rate

4+

Infections/day

H5N2,
H7N3

NR

2–4
months

Achenbach and
Bowen (2011)

f(x) = ?

%

Number of hosts
infected per day by
one infected bird
(assumes a
constant daily rate
over the infectious
period)
% of hosts infected
given contact with
an infected host
and viral load in
the infected host
over the entire
infectious period

There were only 4
contact ducks in each
experiment. Results are
likely strain-dependent
(Sturm-Ramirez et al.,
2005). This experiment
tested contact
transmission in 23
different strains of
H5N1 isolated from a
variety of domestic and
wild bird host species.
22/23 strains
transmitted by contact
and one of these only
transmitted to 1/2
contacts.
There were only 4
contact ducks in each
experiment and all 4
were infected in 1–2
days following
exposure.

0.3

L/kg body
mass/day

Transmission
probability
function

Rangea -VI

f(x) = ?

Environmental transmission
Water uptake rate

Virus decay rate in
water

0.05 ± 0.04 at
5 ◦ C; 2.8 ± 3.1
40 ◦ Ce

Virions/day

Amount of water
drunk per day per
host
Number of
infectious viral
particles that decay
per day

This relationship
remains unknown and
thus most models do
not include effects of
within-host viral
dynamics on
epidemiological
outcome.
Isanhart et al.
(2011)
H1N1;
H2N4;
H3N2;
H4N6;
H5N2;
H6N4;
H7N6;
H8N4;
H9N2;
H10N7;
H11N6;
H12N5

NR

NR

Handel et al.
(2013)

Decay rates vary
dramatically
depending on strain
and water
temperature. Other
factors such as salinity,
pH and organic content
affect decay rates too
but these were not
tested in Handel et al.
(2013).
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Rangeb -PCR

Parameter

Transmission
probability

c
d
e

100% at
102.8 –103.1

% Infected
at
virions/ml
water

Quantitative
relationship
between the
likelihood of
infection given
exposure to a given
viral concentration

H4N6

NR

3 or 6
months

VanDalen et al.
(2010)

There were 8 contact
ducks. Ideally, we need
to understand this
relationship over range
of viral concentrations.
We also need to
understand how
transmission from a
given viral
concentration impacts
subsequent infection
dynamics over range of
viral concentrations.
For example, Van
Dalen et al. determined
that exposure to viral
concentrations in
water between 102.8
and 103.1 leads to
infectious periods of
2.3–4.3 days and peak
viral loads of 102.1 and
104.2 PCR EID50
depending on whether
birds were 3 or 6
months. Thus,
subsequent
transmission may be
possible following
infection at these levels
of water exposure.
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a
b

75% at
102.8 –103.1

Range-VI: gives the measured range of values in the referenced studies that are from virus isolation results.
Range-VI: gives the measured range of values in the referenced studies that are from RT-PCR results.
Strains – host species: lists the strain-host species combinations that were used in the referenced studies.
Caveats: lists the experimental conditions that may have led to the highest and lowest values.
Mean ± standard deviation.
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Fig. 3. Distribution of poultry and wild mallards in the USA. (A) Density of poultry farms. (B) Thirty year annual average mallard band encounters between
1980 and 2010 based on hunter harvest data.

population dynamics affect LPAIV risk across space and
time. A dynamical model parameterized with the recruitment data as well as mallard movement data would allow
for a quantitative understanding of the spatio-temporal
distribution of LPAIV prevalence, which is important for
risk assessment.
The next step would be to design empirical surveillance
studies that temporally monitor mallard-poultry contact
rates, coupled with estimating prevalence of infectious
LPAIVs in mallard populations in select locations where
there is the greatest overlap of poultry and high LPAIV
prevalence in mallards. These studies should include both
backyard and commercial operations with appropriate
sampling designs that account for the differences in the
density of holdings and biosecurity. For example, surveillance in backyard operations should quantify both direct
and indirect contact rates between mallards and poultry and monitor LPAIV prevalence in both populations. In
contrast, surveillance strategies in more secure commercial poultry operations would beneﬁt from monitoring all
wildlife and domestic species on the premises as well as
environmental surfaces because LPAIVs are rarely detected
and the direct role of mallards in spillover is less clear.
This would provide crucial data for quantifying the risk
of transmission given prevalence on the premises as well
as identifying sources (biological or environmental) where
LPAIVs are detected most frequently in close proximity to
poultry.

ﬂock is determined to be infected. When HPAIV (see
note below for Ofﬁce International des Epizooties (OIE)
deﬁnition)2 is detected on a farm, depopulation and other
control activities outlined in the HPAI Response Plan are
conducted in an effort to halt within-farm spread and prevent transmission to other farms (USDA, 2012).
Similar control strategies are applied to LPAIV strains
that are considered to be high-risk for mutation to HPAIV
(i.e., H5 or H7), although LPAIV outbreaks are usually managed without depopulation (Halvorson, 2009). The key
decisions at the ﬂock level involve determining depopulation or controlled-marketing strategies that will minimize
transmission, contamination and time to virus elimination.
Detailed response actions for H5 or H7 LPAIV in USA poultry are carried out in accordance with each state’s H5/H7
LPAIV Initial State Response and Containment Plan.
In the case of detection of non-notiﬁable LPAIV strains
(i.e., non-H5 and non-H7 strains LPAIV), options for onfarm control methods are more numerous and do not
require federal action according to national or state
response plans. The state in which the outbreak is located is
in charge of the response. In these cases, cost-effectiveness
of different control options within an operation and effects
on continuity of business are primary considerations. The
main on-farm control options considered are controlled
marketing (marketing birds after clinical signs are apparent, when shedding is very low), trade/movement bans,
disinfection and, rarely, vaccination (Halvorson, 2002;

3. Transmission within poultry ﬂocks
We now turn from the potential spillover of LPAIVs
from wild birds into poultry to ﬂock-level control methods,
demographics and LPAIV prevalence.
3.1. Control policies
Detection of AIV in poultry occurs at the ﬂock-level:
once conﬁrmed in a single surveillance sample, the whole

2
“For the purpose of disease control programs and international trade
in domestic poultry products, HPAI is deﬁned in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 9, Section 53.1 as: (a) Any inﬂuenza virus that kills at least
75 percent of eight, 4- to 6-week-old susceptible chickens, within ten
days following intravenous inoculation with 0.2 ml of a 1:10 dilution of a
bacteria-free, infectious allantoic ﬂuid. (b) Any H5 or H7 virus that does
not meet the criteria in paragraph (a) of this deﬁnition, but has an amino
acid sequence at the hemagglutinin cleavage site that is compatible with
HPAI viruses. (c) Any inﬂuenza virus that is not a H5 or H7 subtype and
that kills one to ﬁve chickens and grows in cell culture in the absence of
trypsin.”
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Table 2
Population size distribution of production farms in the USA (USDA, 2011).
Turkey farms are meat production. Values are means with standard errors
shown in brackets.
Number of birds

Broiler % (SE)

Table egg % (SE)

Turkey % (SE)

<50,000
50,000–99,999
100,000+

11.7 (0.4)
56.3 (0.6)
32.0 (0.5)

34.3 (2.5)
12.0 (1.9)
53.7 (2.7)

73.4 (0.5)
23.9 (0.4)
2.7 (0.3)

Halvorson et al., 2003). For example, because indemnity
was not available to producers for depopulation of non-H5
or -H7 LPAIV outbreaks in California in 2000–2002, controlled marketing was used successfully to control an H6N2
LPAI outbreak (Cardona, 2005). This involved on-farm,
active surveillance testing of ﬂocks prior to movement to
slaughter, thus reducing the risk of moving actively shedding ﬂocks. If the ﬂock was determined to be clinically
infected, movement was prohibited until after the ﬂock had
seroconverted. Live-haul operators were required to follow
designated routes that were chosen to avoid exposure of
poultry ﬂocks on facilities adjacent to roadways. Most of
the inﬂuenza virus that is shed from a positive ﬂock occurs
during the ﬁrst two weeks of infection, and orderly marketing 3–4 weeks post-onset of clinical signs is currently used
to reduce economic loss to turkey producers (Halvorson,
2003). Similar, voluntary controlled-marketing programs
have been used to control seasonal LPAI outbreaks in turkey
ﬂocks in Minnesota (Cardona, 2005).
3.2. Quantitative host population data
In contrast to mallard populations, the population
structure and demographic dynamics are well deﬁned
for commercial poultry (Fig. 4A). Nearly all poultry
operations with greater than $1000 USD of agricultural sales are surveyed by the Census of Agriculture
(www.agcensus.usda.gov), excluding public, industrial and
grazing association land (USDA, 2008a). The industry is
84.6% production farms (65.6% broiler chickens, 2.3% tableegg chickens and 16.7% meat turkeys) and 15.4% breeder
farms (USDA, 2011). Flock sizes in production farms vary
from <50,000 to >100,000 birds (Table 2, USDA, 2011). The
lifespans and ages of each poultry type within a ﬂock are
homogeneous in production farms. Meat poultry are very
short-lived; on average marketing or slaughter occurs at 7.2
weeks for broiler chickens, 14.2 weeks for turkey hens and
19.7 weeks for turkey toms (USDA, 2011). Table-egg layers
live for an average of 88.7 weeks (molted) and 64.2 weeks
(non-molted) from placement in the house until removal
(roughly 50% of commercial ﬂocks are molted; USDA,
2011). In about 67% of table-egg layer ﬂocks, birds are kept
in cages such that contact between birds in the same cage
occurs readily while between-cage bird contacts are possible but more limited. However, more widespread contact
is possible indirectly through shared water systems, feed
systems and ventilation. In the remaining table-egg layer
ﬂocks and all broiler chickens and turkeys, birds are reared
on the ﬂoor and could potentially contact a larger number
of other birds.
All production poultry are bred through the “primary
breeding system” which makes up the smallest proportion
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of all breeders. For example, 10% of breeder farms for chickens (broilers and layers) are primary breeders compared
with 90% that are multiplier farms (USDA, 2011). Thus, well
under 3% of all farms are primary breeders. Elite primary
breeders make up the smallest number of farms and the
number of farms per breeder category increases with ﬂow
through the system (Fig. 4A). It is estimated that genetic
traits from the elite ﬂocks swamp the production ﬂocks in
about 5 years, meaning that there is roughly a ﬁve year lag
between initial breeding and the time that a potentially different genotype reaches production farms. Breeding farms
can also have more complex age-structure than production ﬂocks but the details depend on the particular farm. In
general, eggs are collected daily from broiler breeders and
brought to the hatchery. Once hatched, chicks will be transferred to a pullet farm or directly to the next breeder farm
at one day of age to be reared to reproductive maturity.
Thus, there is no direct transfer of birds between breeders or between breeders and production farms. The only
direct movement of birds is from pullet farms to production
farms.
Although the majority of commercial poultry are
included in the agricultural census, only a small proportion
of the total poultry operations are included because many
small non-commercial operations, or “backyard ﬂocks”
(21–35 birds on average) exist in the USA (Fig. 4B). A
recent study found that commercial poultry operations in
the USA had an average of 1.9 backyard ﬂocks within 1
mile of their perimeters (USDA, 2005; Garber et al., 2007),
while in Colorado alone, 69% of poultry operations contained 1–50 birds and only 6% had >200 birds (Smith
et al., 2012). In Denver and the surrounding metropolitan cities, 2.2% of residences had backyard ﬂocks with a
higher prevalence in suburban areas (1.55% of residences
in metropolitan Denver, as compared with suburbs (4.4%)).
Most ﬂocks were layers (80.6%) and 37.3% contained multiple species, including waterfowl, pigeons, peafowl, turkey
or exhibition chickens (KL Pabilonia, unpublished data).
The multi-host and other structural differences of the backyard ﬂocks require a different model description because
these differences could impact subtype-speciﬁc transmission dynamics (Duan et al., 2007).
Live-bird markets (LBMs) are another important small
holder poultry system in the USA (Fig. 4C). The majority of the markets are located in a few states (California,
Florida, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; Mullaney,
2003). However, the origin of birds that enter the markets could be almost anywhere in the USA because of
a complex supply system for the numerous species that
may be stocked (Bulaga et al., 2003) (Fig. 4C). Chickens
(spent layers, spent breeder hens, and broilers) are the
most commonly stocked species, with ducks and guinea
fowl among the next most common species (Garber, 2006;
Yee et al., 2008). Other avian species may include turkeys,
quail, chukkars/partridge, pheasant geese and peafowl.
Mammals, most often rabbits, are also common in the liveanimal markets (Trock et al., 2003). The structure of the
LBM system is different from backyard poultry although
there may be informal interactions between them (Fig. 4).
Uniform standards for surveillance, cleaning and disinfection (including rest days where the markets are completely
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Fig. 4. Structure of the poultry industry in the USA. The industry consists of 3 main sectors: commercial (A; multiple colors), backyard (B; brown) and
live-bird market system (C; purple). Dotted gray arrows indicate connections between different sectors. Numbers on arrows indicate the percentage of
poultry that are typically moved between the indicated locations. (A) Production begins with several rounds of breeding to control host genetics. Elite
breeder ﬂocks send eggs to the hatchery (H) where chicks hatch, which takes about 3–5 weeks. Chicks leave hatcheries at 1 day-old. Most chicks will go to
a pullet farm (P) for 18 weeks before the next breeder farm for variable amounts of time (determined by the breeder), although some may go directly to
the next breeder farm. Some table-egg layers will skip the great-grandparent breeding phase. At the ﬁnal stage of breeding (i.e., multiplier farms), broiler
chickens and 43% of turkeys will go directly from a hatchery to a broiler farm or turkey grower, while table-egg layers typically go to a pullet farm before
being transferred to a table-egg production farm. The three different types of commercial poultry (turkey, green; broiler chickens, black; and table-egg
layers, orange) are bred and reared on separate farms, often by separate companies. (B) and (C) The supply chain for backyard ﬂocks (BYF) and live-bird
markets (LBM) involves multiple sources and poultry within each of these holdings incoming and outgoing poultry within each of these sources may contact
each other (i.e., none of these are all-in, all-out operations). Note that “bird, swap, auction, ﬂea market” events are the main mechanisms for interaction
between BYF and LBMS and thus do not belong exclusively to either BYF or LBMS. Data in this ﬁgure were derived from USDA censuses (USDA, 2005, 2011;
Garber, 2006) and unpublished data from surveys of small-scale poultry traders (K. Pabilonia).

depopulated and cleaned) were implemented in 2008 and
have decreased the incidence of AIV in these markets (Trock
and Huntley, 2010).
3.3. Quantitative AIV surveillance data
There is a well-deﬁned process for AIV surveillance in
poultry that includes both passive and active methods.
The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) documents
2.0–2.7 million tests per year for AIV in commercial poultry. Results are reported in the NPIP annual report. Samples
taken from monitored ﬂocks are sent to the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) where they are
assayed for type A inﬂuenza. Type A inﬂuenza-positive
samples are then submitted to the National Veterinary
Services Laboratories (NVSL; Ames, Iowa) to screen for
the presence of H5 or H7 subtypes, and the ﬁndings are
reported to the National Animal Health Policy and Programs (NAHPP) staff in Riverdale, Maryland. Each year,

two or three H5/H7 LPAIV cases are reported in commercial poultry across the USA. Since 2004, all cases have
been LPAIV. Many detections are antibody positive cases,
where live virus is not recovered. There have been four
documented HPAIV outbreaks in the US, one in the upper
Midwest and northeastern LBMs in 1924–1925, a limited
outbreak in New Jersey in 1929, one in commercial farms in
Pennsylvania in 1983–84 (where the initial outbreak strain
was a LPAIV), and one in a LBM supplier in Gonzales (Pelzel
et al., 2006), Texas, and two associated LBMs in Houston,
Texas in 2004 (Swayne, 2008).
Assessing incidence of AIVs in the backyard and LBM
sectors was more challenging historically due to the low
level of testing being conducted as compared with commercial poultry. However, since 1986, states have routinely
conducted surveillance in LBMs because the markets were
shown to be a source of AIV infection for commerial poultry. In 2004, the US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS) published
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uniform program standards (USDA, 2008b) to prevent and
control H5 and H7 LPAIV subtypes in the LBMs. The standards cover (1) licensing, (2) AIV testing, (3) recordkeeping,
(4) sanitation, (5) biosecurity, (6) surveillance, (7) inspection, (8) trace backs, (9) premises registration, (10) trace
outs when positives occur, and (11) response to positive facilities. These standards apply to LBMs, auctions,
and small sales, as well as to producers and distributors
who supply the markets. Overall, since the initiation of
the H5/H7 LPAIV LBM program, the total number of LBMpositive premises has decreased steadily from 63 in 2005
to between 2 and 6 since 2009. Only LPAIVs have been
detected and the predominant subtype varies from year
to year (NVSL annual report, Proceedings from the annual
meeting of the USAHA, 2009, 2010, 2011). In 2007, LPAIV
H7N2, which had been circulating in LBMs in the Northeast
United States since 1994, was declared eradicated.
3.4. Quantitative experimental data
In contrast to mallards where the dominant route of
shedding is through the cloaca or in feces, AIVs are mainly
shed oropharyngeally in gallinaceous poultry (primarily
chickens and turkeys). Oropharyngeal shedding rates of
LPAIV in experimental studies range from undetectable to
100% of the birds shedding. Typical titers from oral samples range from 101 to 105 50% egg infectious doses per
ml (EID50 /ml) depending on the virus isolate and dose
(Morales et al., 2009; Pillai et al., 2010; Spackman et al.,
2010). Cloacal shedding rates of LPAIV also occurs with
the following differences relative to oral shedding: (1)
more birds have shedding rates below detection limits,
(2) detectable shedding is about 1–3 orders of magnitude lower and (3) peak loads are usually 1–2 days later
(Morales et al., 2009; Jackwood et al., 2010; Ladman et al.,
2010; Spackman et al., 2010). HPAIVs are mostly shed
orally with titers as high as 105 to 108 EID50 /ml (Lee et al.,
2005; Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2006; Grund et al.,
2011). The incubation period for both LPAIV and HPAIV
is 24–48 h. The infectious period for LPAIV ranges from 1
to 7 days post-infection (DPI), with a peak of oral shedding at about 2 DPI and a peak of cloacal shedding at
approximately 4 DPI (Morales et al., 2009; Spackman et al.,
2010, 2013). Rarely, virus can be recovered from birds 10
DPI (Morales et al., 2009; Pillai et al., 2010; Spackman
et al., 2010). The infectious proﬁle for HPAIV is the same
except that most birds (i.e., 75–100% of individual birds
that are infected with HPAIV, including chickens, turkeys
and domestic ducks) will not survive beyond the infectious
period, dying between 1 and 5 DPI. As with LPAIV infections, HPAIV survivors will usually not be infectious past
7–10 DPI, but the absolute value depends on infectious dose
(Swayne et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2005).
The duration of immunity from vaccines or natural
infections in poultry is not well understood, although
maternal immunity is known to last approximately two
weeks after hatch. However, the role of pre-existing immunity to AIVs is probably of limited relevance to commercial
poultry in the USA because vaccination is not practiced
(except for vaccination against H1 and H3 in turkey breeders), life-span is short and ﬂocks that become infected
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with HPAIV or H5 or H7 LPAIV are culled. Also, based
on a routine surveillance, it is very rare for a commercial ﬂock to have antibody to AIV of any subtype. Thus,
an appropriate model structure includes disease states:
susceptible-infectious-notiﬁed-depopulated, rather than
including a compartment for immunity. However, in backyard operations and LBMs where there is opportunity
for exposure to multiple strains, pre-existing immunity is
likely very important.
AIVs can be transmitted via several mechanisms in gallinaceous poultry: direct contact (bird-to-bird contact),
indirect contact (e.g., contact with feces, drinking water or
other fomites) or aerosols (van der Goot et al., 2003; Leung
et al., 2007; Yee et al., 2009; Spekreijse et al., 2011, 2013).
Few studies have approached the transmission process
quantitatively. For example, quantiﬁcation of transmission rates absolutely (e.g., Gonzales et al., 2012; Saenz
et al., 2012), determining the likelihood of transmission
from environmental sources or determining relative quantitative differences among transmission mechanisms have
rarely been done for either LPAIV or HPAIV in poultry.
One study using the LPAIV and HPAIV H5N2 outbreak isolates (chicken Pennsylvania 1983) found that 30% of the
susceptible chickens in the LPAIV group were infected,
whereas 100% were infected in the HPAIV group when
cages were placed 1.5 m apart (van der Goot et al., 2003).
Another study showed that transmission between cages
occurred earlier when fecal material was allowed to drop
into lower cages as compared with aerosol-only conditions (Yee et al., 2009). Finally, transmission to susceptible
chickens in cages placed 0.2, 0.4 or 1.1 m from infected
birds was rare (6/72 chickens; only in one replicate trial;
Spekreijse et al., 2011). Collectively these data suggest that
aerosol transmission is less important than contact, but
more experiments are needed before the relative difference between different transmission mechanisms can be
quantiﬁed.
Although this article focuses on transmission processes,
it is important to mention that evolutionary changes
should also be considered in quantitative analyses of the
transmission process. However, this remains an extremely
challenging aspect to understand because neither the conditions facilitating the genesis of reassortants nor those
that impose selection for novel strains are understood well
enough to predict risk of novel HPAIVs, although some
progress has been made using phylogenetic analyses (e.g.,
Duan et al., 2007). These gaps highlight a key priority for
empirical quantitative research. For example, quantiﬁcation of rates of co-infection and the propensity for different
subtypes to co-infect poultry (e.g., Pepin et al., 2013) and
wild hosts are important for estimating rates of reassortment and understanding ecological conditions that favor
them. Likewise, in order to identify conditions that facilitate adaptation, more experimental evolution studies (e.g.,
Giannecchini et al., 2010) and ﬁtness measures in poultry
with isolates from wild hosts are needed.
3.5. Models
Within-ﬂock outbreaks in poultry have been extensively studied using mechanistic models (Savill et al., 2006,
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2008; Bos et al., 2007, 2009; Tiensin et al., 2007; Bouma
et al., 2009; Malladi et al., 2011, 2012; Weaver et al.,
2012; Reeves et al., technical document available on-line).
Increased insight from within-ﬂock models compared to
wild-bird models or system-wide models is largely because
of the precision with which the population dynamics
of single ﬂock can be described. As with the betweenﬂock models described in the next section, within-ﬂock
models typically employ either of two approaches: (1)
developing a simulation model that used condition-speciﬁc
parameters as inputs and produces outbreak dynamics
or transmission parameters as outputs, or (2) ﬁtting a
disease dynamic model to outbreak data and estimating
transmission parameters (or other epidemiological quantities) from the outbreak data. The ﬁrst approach allows
for a scenario-based understanding of within-ﬂock transmission behavior, whereas the second allows for direct
estimation of quantities such as transmission rate.
The versatility of within-ﬂock dynamic-model
approaches has allowed for evaluation of both efﬁcacy and consequences of alternative control methods.
For an example of the former, a within-ﬂock model was
used to generate plausible outbreak data against which
the efﬁcacy of various outbreak detection methods were
compared (Malladi et al., 2011). For an example of the latter, a within-ﬂock model showed that vaccines conferring
incomplete protection could counterintuitively increase
the infectiousness of a ﬂock, by delaying the time to detection and depopulation (Savill et al., 2006). Within-ﬂock
models have also been used to: (1) infer important events
– such as the day of introduction – from mortality data (Bos
et al., 2007), (2) estimate the risk of HPAIV transmission
due to the movement of poultry-industry products from
monitored ﬂocks (i.e., ﬂocks not known to be infected
with HPAIV) into commerce (Malladi et al., 2012), (3)
estimate important epidemiological parameters (Bouma
et al., 2009) and (4) estimate mean time to detection
for HPAIV strains under different surveillance-detection
triggers (Weaver et al., 2012).
3.6. Priorities for quantitative research
In the USA, within-ﬂock transmission data are largely
limited to a few small-scale transmission studies. Thus, the
accuracy of within-ﬂock transmission models cannot be
quantiﬁed, and our data-based understanding of transmission dynamics (i.e., estimates of transmission derived from
outbreak data) in different poultry sectors remains weak.
However, because the details of USA poultry-population
demography and structure are well-deﬁned, simulation
models can be used to understand how the structure of
different poultry sectors impacts transmission rates of
AIV throughout different poultry sectors using situationspeciﬁc details as inputs. Indeed, such dynamic models
(not validated by outbreak data) speciﬁcally tailored to
the USA situation have been used to improve our mechanistic understanding of within-ﬂock transmission from a
theoretical standpoint (Malladi et al., 2012; Weaver et al.,
2012). However, the tools used in these studies have been
underused relative to the number of pressing questions
that could be addressed. For example: (1) how does the

type of poultry sector impact within-ﬂock transmission
rates?; and (2) how does the type of surveillance data –
active versus passive – impact estimates of infection of the
index case?. In addition, as more within-ﬂock data become
available results from these simulation studies should be
validated.
4. Transmission between poultry ﬂocks
Now we summarize AIV-response decisions and quantitative data pertaining to transmission between different
poultry ﬂocks.
4.1. Control policies
AIV management goals at the between-ﬂock level
involve conducting epidemiological investigations, surveillance, depopulation, movement restrictions, biosecurity
and public awareness campaigns in a manner that
will identify at-risk premises and minimize betweenfarm spread. Extensive trace-back and trace-forward
epidemiological investigations are conducted in which
the movement of people, animals, equipment and other
materials between ﬂocks in the period leading up to the
detection of infection on premises are investigated. Thus,
a key immediate decision is to deﬁne a maximum period
prior to detection that should be considered for trace-back
and trace-forward investigations. This decision is often
informed through estimation of the date of the initial case
using daily mortality data, production data, current diagnostic results (i.e., continued shed of virus versus antibody
only persistence) and date of last negative ﬂock test. The
spatial area surrounding infected premises where surveillance should be intensiﬁed during and following the event
is usually unclear. Recent movements into the ﬂock (e.g.,
spiking roosters), bird placement dates, and recent handling of birds on the farm are the main considerations for
determining the spatial boundaries of surveillance. However, these issues could be well-served by quantitative
models, especially in the ﬁrst few days when data are
limited.
An equally important consideration is to identify the
temporal and spatial intensity at which surveillance should
be conducted in epidemiologically linked premises and
how the surveillance protocol should change on premises
that are closed versus those that continue with business.
These surveillance protocols, which are implemented to
maintain continuity of business during an outbreak, can
be labor- and resource-intensive. Advance planning is used
to determine how laboratories will leverage their critical
diagnostic resources and laboratory support (e.g., Secure
Egg Supply Plan www.secureeggsupply.com) to manage
the signiﬁcant increase in incoming samples and urgent
need for results. Parsimonious quantitative models that
rapidly determine the cost-effectiveness for alternative
surveillance protocols would be valuable.
4.2. Quantitative host population data
The vast majority of commercial poultry farms operate
as all-in, all-out with no access to the outside environment
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(Fig. 4A). The turnover rates for broilers and meat turkeys
are about 5.5 and 2.8 times per year respectively (8.9 billion sold to 1.6 billion inventory; 296 million sold to 107
million inventory; respectively) based on a census conducted in 2007 (USDA, 2007). However, for caged-layer
operations, all-in all-out only applies to individual barns
(which are considered to be separate ﬂocks with multiple
barns on one layer complex), while for broilers, it refers
to all birds on an operation (which comprise one whole
ﬂock divided amongst several barns). For table-egg layers,
all birds are the same age in 38.4% of farms, while 60.7%
have birds of different ages in different barns and 0.9%
have birds of different ages in the same barn. Also, 7.2%
of farms raise their own pullets, which is another potential
means for poultry of different ages to be present on layer
farms (USDA, 2011). Meat-type turkey operations may be
either single-age premises (i.e., all-in, all-out) or multi-age
complexes in which younger brooder birds are raised on
the same premises as grow-out birds, ensuring that these
premises are almost never empty (USDA, 2011). For tableegg layers, the barns remain empty for an average of 17
days after poultry are removed (USDA, 2000). For transportation of birds off farms, nearly all broiler farms and
about 80% of turkey farms use vehicles dedicated to the
company (USDA, 2011). However, roughly 90% of table-egg
farms use vehicles that are also used by other companies
(USDA, 2011).
Sources of new birds also differ between types of operations. Most (76.9%) table-egg farms received pullets that
were produced by multiplier ﬂocks owned by a primary
breeder company. In contrast, almost all broiler farms and
∼50% of turkey farms receive chicks/poults from companyowned multiplier farms.
The biosecurity of backyard ﬂocks contrasts sharply
with that of commercial operations. A recent study in Colorado found that 97% of backyard ﬂocks have access to the
outside environment and birds in 35% of the ﬂocks are able
to leave the property (Smith et al., 2012). The vast majority
of backyard ﬂocks do not practice all-in, all-out management, which allows for signiﬁcant bird movement to and
from these ﬂocks. Up to 46% of owners move birds off their
properties annually, primarily to attend bird shows, sell
birds at swap meets, auctions or ﬂea markets, take birds
to slaughter or LBMs or move birds to/from other backyard
ﬂocks (Smith et al., 2012), but there are little data on the
precise rates and location of these movements.

widespread multi-ﬂock LPAIV outbreaks, which occurred
in Virginia in 2002, was especially well-documented and
included data from a detailed epidemiological investigation (McQuiston et al., 2005). Initially, the H7N2 strain
was detected in a single commercial turkey-breeder ﬂock
and the operation immediately depopulated. However, 4
additional farms were conﬁrmed positive within a week of
initial detection and 60 farms within a month. By the end of
the outbreak, 197 total farms had been affected, including
facilities with both turkeys and chickens, and an estimated
cost of $149 million (McQuiston et al., 2005).
An epidemiological investigation of the Virginia outbreak collected data from 151 infected farms and 199
control farms in an effort to identify risk factors of infection. Some of the data recorded, which could be important
for development of mechanistic models, were: farm location, date of reported infection, date of depopulation or
recovery, age of infected birds, number of birds, number of
poultry barns, type of barns, worker activities, biosecurity
measures and presence of wild, livestock and peridomestic host species. Although information on the origin and
destination of trafﬁc coming onto and leaving farms was
not reported in the McQuiston et al. (2005) study, it was
documented by the USDA. There were also genetic analyses of the isolates collected during the outbreak (Spackman
et al., 2003). Together, these data can be used to: (1) develop
a parsimonious model that quantiﬁes rates and patterns
of between-farm spread, (2) test predictions, quantify
uncertainty and validate crucial ﬂock-level simulationmodeling tools such as the North American Animal Disease
Spread Model (NAADSM) (Harvey et al., 2007), InterSpread
Plus (Stevenson et al., 2013) or AusSpread (Garner and
Beckett, 2005), and (3) evaluate outbreak response strategies (Fig. 5).

4.3. Quantitative AIV surveillance data

4.5. Models

Data on the between-farm spread of AIV in the USA
is challenging to obtain because: (1) these data are commercially sensitive, (2) data collection during emergency
response efforts is usually not prioritized, and (3) surveillance and response are so effective that disease rarely
spreads after detection. Nevertheless, 10 multi-ﬂock outbreaks of LPAIV have occurred since the 1920s, one of which
included evolution from a LPAIV strain to a HPAIV strain
(Pennsylvania 1983; Halvorson, 2009). In total, these outbreaks have cost the industry $368 million, which does not
include costs to consumers for increases in egg and poultry prices (Halvorson, 2009). One of the more recent and

Between-farm transmission of agricultural animal diseases is an archetypical process for development of
quantitative methods in spatial infectious-disease dynamics (Schoenbaum and Terry Disney, 2003; Garner and
Beckett, 2005; Karsten et al., 2005a,b; Harvey et al., 2007;
Riley, 2007; Sharkey et al., 2008; Tildesley et al., 2008, 2010;
Stevenson et al., 2013). Models of between-farm spread of
HPAIV H7N7 in The Netherlands (Boender et al., 2007) and
HPAIV H7N1 in Italy (Dorigatti et al., 2010) have quantiﬁed
spread rates and patterns using maximum likelihood estimation, and have determined control strategies that would
minimize spatial spread in future outbreaks by simulation.

4.4. Quantitative experimental data
To our knowledge, there are no experimental data quantifying rates and mechanisms of between-farm spread
using a model system, mainly because such an experiment would be too costly and risky to conduct. The lack of
such data underscores the importance of quantifying these
processes using naturally produced outbreak data and verifying our understanding of the between-farm processes
that are currently described mathematically in highlyparameterized simulation models.
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Fig. 5. Conceptual representations of two different approaches to modeling poultry disease outbreaks. (A) Bottom-up approach. Parameters from epidemiological investigations and other sources are input into a detailed simulation of routes of transmission. Within the simulation, a local area is represented by
the dotted box. In this example, contact of an infectious premises (open circle) with a focal premises that becomes infected (open star) is via long distance
transmission represented by the dotted line. Other types of contact and potential routes of transmission from the focal infected premises to susceptible
premises (ﬁlled circles) may be by different routes represented by the black and gray solid lines. The detailed simulation output is often a spatial-temporal
prediction of outbreak dynamics. (B) Top-down approach. Spatial-temporal outbreak infection data are the input for model ﬁtting of a local spread model.
Some features of the detailed simulation model, such as long distance transmission represented by the dotted line may be maintained. Other features such
as speciﬁc, local transmission routes can be subsumed into a general, local transmission kernel represented by the shaded circle with highest transmission
risk near the infectious premises and decreasing transmission risk with distance. This approach may result in a simpler model that can more easily be ﬁt
to outbreak data. The output of a local spread model is often estimated outbreak parameters, such as between-premises transmission rates or the time
between initial infection and notiﬁcation.

Recently, progress has also been made in developing a theoretical framework for estimating between-farm spread
of AIV and identifying effective control strategies using
contact-tracing data, outbreak data and Bayesian inference
(Jewell and Roberts, 2012). Bayesian inference of an underlying spatial transmission model has also been used to
show that although backyard farms in Thailand were a key
element of the successful propagation of the 2004–2005
wave of H5N1 infections, it is likely that improved biosecurity within the commercial farming sector was responsible
for the subsequent overall reduction in transmissibility in
the system.
For AIVs in the USA, disease-dynamic simulation models
have been used to: (1) understand which epidemiologic parameters have large impacts on potential spread
of HPAIV (Patyk et al., 2013), (2) estimate the consequences of a potential incursion of HPAIV into the USA
(Patyk et al., 2013), and (3) estimate the time to detection on farms (Dorea et al., 2010). Flock-level simulation
models have been used to estimate the economic consequences of HPAIV introductions in speciﬁc areas as

well as the cost-effectiveness of situation-speciﬁc alternative control strategies (Patyk et al., 2013). This model
includes numerous empirically determined parameters
that describe details of poultry population demographics,
structure and movement between facilities, and has undergone many tests to validate the model structure and to
measure output variation (due to stochasticity).
4.6. Priorities for quantitative research
Much of the previous and current quantitative research
on the between-farm spread of AIV in the USA involves
ﬂock-based simulation models with numerous parameters (Harvey et al., 2007; Patyk et al., 2013; Fig. 5A). This
approach is valuable because it permits the examination
of outcomes under particular circumstances which may
be important when preparing for unknown events that
could occur anywhere in the country. That is, geographic
variation in the distribution of poultry facilities and how
these facilities may be connected varies widely across the
country which means that transmission patterns occurring
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from any particular introduction of AIV could depend on
where the introduction occurs. Although, the detailed models mentioned above are constructed with ﬁeld-measured
parameters, their output is only as accurate as our a priori assumptions about how the parameters are connected.
Thus, an important priority is to assess the accuracy of these
models using data (i.e., how well these models predict realworld outcomes). Complimentary decision-support tools
such as the development of simpler quantitative models
of between-farm spread are also needed (e.g., Fig. 5B):
models with large numbers of parameters inherently produce output with higher uncertainty. Also, complex models
can be computationally intense limiting their utility during an emergency when a reliable answer may be needed
within hours (although the complex models listed above
are intended for use in advance of an outbreak). In our
opinion, the data similar to those collected during the 2002
Virginia outbreak provide an opportunity for developing
simpler models that: (1) may produce results with reasonable uncertainties, (2) estimate important quantities such
as the time between infection and notiﬁcation or the radius
for surveillance around infected premises, and (3) validate
output of simulation models. This research is critical for
gaining a data-based understanding of the processes that
determine AIV spread between poultry operations.
5. Conclusion
We discussed how dynamical models can be used to
inform AIV prevention and response policies in a large
commercial poultry industry, using the USA as a case
study. We identiﬁed the following important goals for
modeling research that can be accomplished with current data: (1) quantify the spatio-temporal relationship
between wild hosts and poultry in terms of population
sizes and AIV prevalence, (2) understand how the structure of different poultry sectors impacts AIV transmission
within poultry ﬂocks, (3) quantify processes responsible for
AIV spread between poultry operations, and (4) validate
current policy-decision tools with data.
While the focus of this article has been on using currently available data for the development of quantitative
tools that serve animal and public health policy decisions,
data resources for such tools are clearly limited and could
be improved substantially with relatively limited additional investment during key periods. Usually, when an
outbreak occurs, the situation is an emergency and data collection for the purpose of informing future (or even current)
quantitative analyses takes low priority. Although some
data are always collected, the types (and quality) of data
vary by outbreak due to situation-speciﬁc circumstances.
Most outbreak data sets exclude simple pieces of information that could greatly improve our ability to estimate
important control parameters. One way to enhance data
resources would be through standardization of data collection during outbreaks. With the appropriate collaboration
of expertise, including quantitative scientists, response
personnel and policymakers; the development of such an
outbreak-data collection policy could be achieved in a
way that minimizes risk of contamination during response,
maximizes cost-effectiveness and operational efﬁciency,
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and includes data that are essential for improving quantitative tools. Such a policy could generate high-value data
resources that would facilitate the development of accurate
response-oriented quantitative preparedness tools.
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